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Law as Film: Representing Justice in the Age of Moving
Images 
Shulamit Almog† and Ely Aharonson‡
‘‘It is not easy to believe in unknowable justice’’ ones, the law makes continuous and complicated efforts
to provide itself with legitimacy. 1 One method it uses to— W.H. Auden, Compline
create this sense of legitimacy is to present its actions as
‘‘We have raised a dust and complain that we cannot see’’ phenomenological embodiments of the abstract idea of
justice, thereby creating an epistemological hierarchy— George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Princi-
between actions that take place within the legal systemples of Human Knowledge
and those that occur outside of it. 2
It is in this context that the maxim that ‘‘justice
Introduction must be seen in order to be done’’ 3 becomes relevant.
The visibility of justice in a court of law enhances the
wo main theses are presented here. The first is that legitimacy of the act of judgment that has been per-T there is a conceptual resemblance between the ways formed. Yet this needs to be unpacked: Justice is not a
in which messages are transmitted in the courtroom and concrete object that can be ‘‘seen’’, so when we speak of
the ways in which they are transmitted in the cinema. ‘‘seeing justice’’, we are actually speaking about seeing an
The second is that the evolution of legal procedure is image that we associate with justice. In order for the legal
being influenced by developments taking place in visual system to show us that it is doing justice, it must con-
culture generally and film specifically. Taken together, stantly present us with such images. Thus, for a particular
these theses lead to the conclusion that the development society’s legal system to gain broad social legitimacy as a
of a theory of ‘‘law-as-film’’ can provide insights into the justice-producing system, it must effectively represent,
contemporary practice of law that might otherwise be through its performances of adjudication, images of the
overlooked. abstract concept of justice commonly adhered to in that
society.
One of the ways to think about law is as a system ofPart I: Law as Film 
representation that seeks to convince society that it
maintains exclusive control over the meaning of the con-
How can justice be seen? Law as a system cept of justice. In furtherance of this goal, it continually
of visual representations seeks to demonstrate its skill in the identification and
application of the concept in ways that are visible to, and
 commonly accepted concept of justice serves as the accepted by, society at large.A foundation of every legal system. Societies entrust
judges with the authority to delineate the commonly  To do this, the law must find the best means for
ascribed-to concept of justice through the application of effectively representing to the subjects of its legal empire
general law to particular situations, the development of that justice is being done. In furtherance of this goal, it
precedent, and the interpretation of existing rules. The uses various performative strategies, including narrative,
rulings of judges override private conceptions or inter- rhetoric, ritual, and the like. 4 Through the rational use of
pretations of justice, and, where necessary, society these means of representation, law seeks to conjure phe-
empowers judges to order the use of physical force to nomenological embodiments of the abstract concept of
ensure the supremacy of their views. In order to validate justice within the courtroom. Without such representa-
the supremacy of judicial interpretations over private tions, the concept of justice will remain abstract and
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unrecognizable, and the legal system will find it difficult term habeas corpus is ‘‘you may have the body’’, and it
to create the impression that it is really doing justice. required that the accused be brought within the space in
which the legal proceedings regarding his fate were to beThe task of representing an abstract idea through
conducted. Thus, even though the points to be adjudi-performative or visual imagery is always a Sisyphean one,
cated involved the person’s prior actions, which of coursehowever. Members of society at large, as observers of the
could not be completely re-created in the courtroom, thelegal system and the recipients of its messages about
law presented itself as acting upon a reality immediatelyjustice, will always suspect that what is being observed is
before it: The question of whether the physical body inonly a substitution for the ‘‘real thing’’ — for ‘‘truth’’,
the room could or could not be held by the authorities.‘‘justice’’, or, more concretely, for the bygone event that
By rephrasing the question in this manner, the lawthe legal system purports to be currently adjudicating.
enhances the legitimacy of its manner of adjudicating
When a judge (or other finder of fact under a the fate of the accused, because it appears to be grappling
judge’s supervision) sets out to apply the law to a specific directly with reality. Given its performative effectiveness,
set of facts, he or she almost never has access to the actual it is no wonder that the principle of habeas corpus has
event that took place, yet he or she needs to make nor- managed to survive the enormous changes Western law
mative determinations about that event on the basis of has undergone since the age of the Roman Empire. 5
the evidence in front of him or her. That ‘‘evidence’’,
however, consists entirely of the various representations
The status of legal procedure within theof the event that are offered to the court by witnesses
and advocates. Obviously, such testimony and exhibits system of visual representation 
can only partially reconstruct the full complexity of the The history of the ‘‘visibility’’ of law has been much
event as it occurred. And even if the evidence could fully neglected. 6 Given the importance of transforming adju-
reconstruct the occurrence being adjudicated, the dication into visible form, legal scholars should try to
authoritative interpretation that the finder of fact is com- develop the critical tools necessary to analyze various
pelled to produce — the actual ‘‘finding of fact’’ — is legal systems’ performance of this function. Discussions
necessarily truncated, and cannot possibly detail every regarding judges’ use of rhetorical and narrative strategies
shade, nuance and facet of the actual event. Therefore, in their legal opinions are already prevalent in legal
the legally found ‘‘facts’’ to which the legal system applies scholarship, but comparatively little critical examination
the law are facially only a facsimile of the event that has been done of the performative ways in which justice
purportedly is being adjudicated. This gap between the is represented during the actual course of legal proceed-
actual and purported subjects of legal analysis — the gap ings. In part, this is an explicable academic skew: Careful
between reality and representation — tends to throw analysis of judicial opinions is the main interest of legal
into focus the limited ability of the law to apply justice scholars because they are plentiful, easy to access, and
to actual events. Thus, the legal system has to work very suit the textual proclivities of academics. Without ques-
hard to present the re-creation of events in the court- tioning the importance of textual analysis, we feel it
room as a direct, unmitigated view into the events as necessary to point out that such analysis fails to capture
they actually occurred. If it fails to do so, the legitimacy large swathes of legal activity. 7 We aim to rectify this
of any legal decision regarding this purported reality will situation by focusing on the way in which law transmits
be undermined. The legal system’s ability to convince us its messages during the actual process of adjudication,
that justice has been done (or, more accurately, that in with an emphasis on the means by which procedural
doing justice no injustice has been done) depends on its rules promote the visibility of justice. In embarking on
ability to conceal the gaps between reality and represen- this endeavour, we draw heavily on film theory, both
tation. because cinematic production is the primary field for the
The primary instrument law uses in this respect is production of visual images, and because the tools that
visibility — the translation of abstract adjudication into cinema has used to create an impression of transmitted
something that can be visibly apprehended, and reality cast light on the ways in which law seeks to
accepted, by society. The more convincingly justice can obtain a similar goal.
be rendered visible, the more likely it is that members of The need to investigate the methods used to
the community will accept, even if only momentarily, represent justice during legal proceedings derives from
that abstract justice has been done. Thus, to the degree the need to broaden our perspective regarding legal per-
the legal system can convincingly convey that it is oper- formance beyond a study of written opinions. The rea-
ating upon the actual subject of its adjudication, as soning of judges, as recorded in written opinions, is of
opposed to a mere representation thereof, it will be able course of fundamental significance; however, its ability
to acquire greater legitimacy for the decisions made by to convince us of its basic soundness (both in general
its judges. and with respect to particular opinions) depends to a
For instance, Roman law’s institution of the legal great extent on our willingness to accept the propriety of
principle of habeas corpus improved the visibility of a the proceedings that led up to the legal opinion in ques-
certain kind of adjudication. The meaning of the Latin tion.
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Take, for instance, the legal system presented in performance as a whole. Consider, in this regard, the
Franz Kafka’s The Trial. Kafka imagined a legal system symbolic entrance of a judge or panel of judges into a
that abandoned any attempt at producing representa- courtroom, accompanied by the voice of the bailiff and
tions of legitimacy during the course of legal proceed- the rising of the public to its feet. It resembles nothing so
ings, and that instead sought to assert its authority and much as the beginning of a piece of theatre whose
validity only after a decision had been reached. Charac- internal rules are defined by legal procedure.
ters simply wander the corridors of the investigation hall Through the use of devices drawn from the poetics
without encountering any visible representations of of law, the legal system seeks to persuade observers of the
adjudication or symbols of ‘‘justice being done’’, until legitimacy of the way in which it does justice.
finally they are presented with a ruling, a fait accompli. 8 The performance of adjudication has two facets,Kafka’s thought experiment demonstrates the way in each of which depends upon the translation of thewhich robbing the adjudicative process of its presenta- abstract into the visible. First, the legal system has totional and performative aspects subverts the authority convince society that during the course of a trial, anand credibility of the law. Moreover, it emphasizes the incident that occurred in the past, and at which neitherimportance of centralizing the law’s representational judge nor jury was present, was optimally re-created soefforts in the loci of authority where adjudication actu- that its consequences could be adjudicated and norma-ally takes place (i.e., in the courts). tive strictures fairly applied. Second, the legal system has
to convince its audience, including the parties, spectators,Legal procedure plays a unique role in shaping legal
and commentators, that it credibly performed justice,performance. Procedure is the construct through which
which means that the appropriate images of justice beingan entire legal proceeding is produced (we will focus on
done have to have been publicly displayed. To preservethe nature of this production in Part II). Procedure dic-
its authority, every legal proceeding has to create withintates the setting in which representations of justice take
its audience the sense that the methods used to do jus-place; it determines what will occur, and in what order
tice are effective, which means that the abstract form ofand in what fashion. In this way, procedure establishes
justice has to be convincingly translated into visualthe space in which the legal system attempts to represent
images. If the legal system is not convincing in its depic-adjudication and the doing of justice. Accordingly, legal
tion of abstract justice being done, it will quickly lose theprocedure is not merely a collection of rules for facili-
monopoly granted to it by society over the process oftating effective legal decisions; it is also, and perhaps
defining and applying justice.primarily, a system for determining how one can pro-
duce effective performances within the courtroom, a
semantic field in which attorneys, witnesses, judges, and
Why law and film? the legal system at large seek to create meaning (justice,
truth, reliability, objectivity, etc.) through their perform-
ances. Legal procedure, from this perspective, can be
Using film theory to decipher legal representation defined as a system of rules that determines the permis-
Why law and film?11 First, law does not function insible means of articulation to be used within this
a vacuum. In order for its representations of ‘‘justicesemantic field. To employ a term from aesthetics, one
being done’’ to be effective, the legal system must makecan describe procedure as the poetics of legal proceed-
use of strategies and signifiers drawn from culture atings.
large. Conceptions of justice are largely socially con-
The literal meaning of the Greek term poetics is structed, and to this extent they rely upon generally
‘‘the art of doing’’. Following Aristotle, the term is usually accepted conventions, images and ideas to derive their
used in analyzing aesthetic semantic fields. In a more meanings. 12 Such images form the framework through
general sense, however, a poetics is any system of rules which we filter and process reality. As part of this general
that delineates how meanings are generated in a partic- framework, each of us has accumulated an enormous
ular field and why they are accepted as meaningful. 9 reservoir of audio and visual capital, comprised of hun-
Poetics views a semantic field in terms of the effects it dreds of thousands of images, that influences our percep-
generates in those who encounter it. Thus, a writer well tions of justice. In our age, cinema has been one of the
versed in literary poetics understands how to create primary suppliers of this symbolic capital. It is therefore
upon the reader the effect he or she desires. possible to speak of a certain cinematization of our
thinking about justice, a cinematization that is part of aLaw also has a poetics. Through strict adherence to
far broader cultural phenomenon.13the poetics of law, the legal system attempts to ensure
that the participants in a legal performance utilize the The field of cultural production is highly decentral-
means available to them to transmit the message that ized. Within its borders, meanings are dynamically and
justice is being done. 10 There are a number of recipients ceaselessly produced, without any clear hierarchies
of this message: The judge and jury serve as the audience between producers. 14 When the law tries to entrench the
for attorneys and witnesses, while spectators, both in the supremacy of its interpretation of justice, it must com-
courtroom and outside it, are the audience for the legal pete with these masses of alternative meanings. Journal-
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ists and entertainers, politicians and architects, stage we have to examine the degree to which they contribute
directors and educators — all participate in the discourse to our ability to perceive actual adjudication, or whether,
regarding ‘‘what is just’’. But as the most popular artistic perhaps, they merely serve to conceal the limits of the
medium of the 20th century, the cinema has taken a law’s ability actually to do justice.
central position in the debate and has emerged as an Using aesthetic theory to investigate legal discourses
especially powerful generator of meaning. Just as cinema is not new, of course: ‘‘law as literature’’ has long thrived
has come to influence the products we choose to buy, as an academic subgenre, and to a large extent it serves as
our interpersonal relationships, and our political prefer- a theoretical model for the course we are proposing
ences, it has come to shape our thinking about the shape here. 18 Law as literature seeks, among other things, to
of justice. examine the rhetorical and narrative means used by
judges to justify the ‘‘justness’’ of their decisions. Its pri-To examine the poetics of law (i.e., the unique
mary tools are the sophisticated techniques of literarymethods that law employs to create its desired effect on
criticism, which are well suited for adaptation to theits audience), we have to examine whether and in what
textual aspects of the law.19 The emphasis on deconstruc-way these methods are influenced by the dominant
tive textual analysis has helped unveil some of thepoetics of our time: The poetics of film. Different systems
methods legal actors use to legitimize their decisions,of poetics are in constant correspondence with each
and has led to renewed focus on the ethical aspects ofother. 15 Unsurprisingly, the introduction and develop-
those decisions. 20 Our proposal for an investigation ofment of film, and its growing impact throughout the last
‘‘law as film’’ is an extension of this project, wherein andecades, has deeply influenced the poetics of other fields,
additional critical tool, film theory, is used to probefrom literature and theatre to politics and education.
another, non-textual aspect of adjudication, the actualThis has only been amplified by the rapid rise of televi-
proceedings conducted in court. Although its roots gosion and the Internet, media that largely share the
quite deep, the emergence of ‘‘law and literature’’ as animagistic vocabulary and narrative conventions of film.16
academic field is a relatively new phenomenon, generally(Other computerized devices also rely, to some degree,
dated to the publication of James Boyd White’sTheon the principles of cinematic expression.) 17 Given the
Legal Imagination in 1973. 21 The field is usually dividedimportance of the language of film to contemporary
into two categories: law as literature, which focuses onthinking generally, an examination of the interaction
literary readings of legal texts, and law in literature,between cinematic expression and legal articulation is a
which focuses on depictions of law in literary works. Toprerequisite to any analysis of perceptions of justice in
date, ‘‘law and film’’ scholarship has generally paralleledthe age of the moving image. And even if the importance
the study of law in literature, that is, it has focused onof the ‘‘silver screen’’ is gradually diminishing, the
representations of legal practice in film. We wish to focusadvanced technologies that are replacing it still must be
on the alternative perspective — namely law as film. 22interpreted through our existing epistemological frame-
Our goal is to apply cinematic criticism to legal proceed-work. For the time being, we process these sophisticated
ings themselves, in order to determine how meaningmanipulations of moving images using the interpretive
and representation are produced in the courtroom.strategies we have learned at the cinema.
Second, the methodological posture of law-as-film,
like other ‘‘law &’’ disciplines, offers a critical perspective What does ‘‘Law as Film’’ mean? 
on the law that cannot be achieved from a viewpoint  At first glance, the substantial differences between
inside the legal discourse. Legal academia and practice producing a motion picture and conducting a legal pro-
tend to regard the deconstruction of legal language and ceeding are evident. To create meaning and narrative, a
performance as an esoteric pursuit, and it is therefore film crew uses tools — photography, editing, sound-
frequently overlooked. The result is a paucity of system- tracks, etc. — that are not available to those running a
atic, critical assessments of the representative functions of trial. Yet it would be wrong to fetishize the technological
legal procedure; instead, procedure is all too often means employed in filmmaking. What is essential to
written off as a mere compilation of ‘‘the rules of the cinematic poetics is the attempt to bridge the gap
game’’. We hope to remedy this situation, in part, by between reality and representation. More than any other
applying the techniques developed in cinematic studies artistic medium, cinema tries to limit the viewer’s aware-
to legal procedure. ness that he or she is watching a constructed representa-
tion of reality as opposed to reality itself. Legal proceed-Film’s enormous success in creating an impression
ings share this goal.of transmitted reality quickly led critics to question the
extent to which cinematic depiction actually provides As described above, justice, indeed, must be seen to
reliable information about an object or event. Film be done: The legal system must present convincing
theory therefore deals extensively with the way in which depictions of just adjudication if its pronouncements
‘‘reality’’ is conveyed by cinematic poetics. A similar regarding law and justice are to be accepted as legitimate
problem is posed by legal proceedings. Legal proceedings by society at large. To convey a message or tell a story, a
are a kind of controlled visual performance, and as such film similarly has to produce convincing images of the
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events and characters it purports to depict. The cinema’s In his article ‘‘The Evolution of the Language of
enormous success in doing so over the past 80 years has Cinema’’, Bazin describes the various means of expres-
made it a powerful shaper of popular conceptions of sion that induce us to accept as ‘‘real’’ the images scam-
love, beauty, virtue, and justice. pering by on the big screen. Most importantly, styles of
photography, such as close-ups or slow-motion shots, canThe need to create convincing visual representa-
stress elements of the original event that likely wouldtions of abstract ideas is thus a common component of
have gone unnoticed without the intervention of thelegal and cinematic performance. Towards this end, both
camera. Similarly, an emphasis on the depth of the spacefields employ systematic poetics. Some of the devices
filmed through the use of long shots and deep focusthey use are similar: Both in the courtroom and on a
creates a dynamic, according to Bazin, that ‘‘brings themovie set, the scenery, costumes, and staging of the char-
spectator into a relation with the image closer to thatacters are tightly controlled. Many devices are different,
which he enjoys with reality’’. 27but that is not a reason to abandon the analogy. At a
conceptual level, there is a resonance between the ways Like films, the legal system also tries to convince us
in which the legal system and the cinema approach a that the procedures it employs to judge reality enable it
common problem, and this conceptual similarity trumps to reconstruct it as precisely as possible. Through the
the differences in the technologies employed in the two rules of procedure, the participants in a legal proceeding
fields. isolate a certain event from all the events with which it is
interconnected, breaking it off from the stream of history
Phenomenological Aspects of the Cinematic and in order to focus on a certain, defined, ‘‘relevant’’ group
Legal Viewing Experiences of facts. Procedural and evidentiary rules limit a legal
proceeding to certain kinds of facts by insisting thatWatching a film and attending a legal proceeding
descriptions of an event be limited to certain narratorsboth begin with the viewer’s entrance into a defined
(witnesses who are acquainted with the event at firstperformative space: A movie theatre in the first instance,
hand) who can only speak on certain topics (ones deter-a courtroom in the second.23 Each is a bounded space
mined judicially ‘‘relevant’’). These rules (and others)where conduct is regulated by a set of idiosyncratic rules.
form an efficient framework for the narrative construc-Beyond these similarities, however, is a more all encom-
tion of reality. The fact of the matter is that realitypassing one: In each arena, those charged with gener-
cannot be assessed without some kind of segmentationating meaning seek to create a type of mimetic illusion,
into manageable chunks, which makes necessary theand they use conceptually similar devices in order to do
utilization of a process for performing this editing (phys-so.
ical editing in the case of film; procedural limitations inThe status of the audience both in a movie theatre
the case of the law). In order to ensure that the resulting,and in the courtroom is characterized by an ambivalence
edited reality is still comprehensible, additional tech-caused by its simultaneous presence and absence. In a
niques have to be used to emphasize important pointsmovie theatre, the audience and the screen are physically
and downplay minor ones. In films, this is done throughpresent, but the events depicted on the screen are not.
photographic techniques such as zooms, whereas in theYet the visual precision of the filmed images, the impres-
courtroom, it is accomplished by procedural devices,sion of movement, and the addition of sound effects
such as the telescopic focusing of a cross-examination,often succeeds in convincing the spectator that he or she
redirect, and recross on an increasingly narrow subjectis actually watching the filmed events as they unfold.
matter.When successful, a film manages to efface the gaps in
time and space between the moment of photography In the field of poetics, the legal system’s desire to
and the moment of screening. This effect led a writer for convey that it is reproducing reality is described as an
the French newspaper La Poste, upon leaving the first attempt at verisimilitude. 28 Verisimilitude is a poetic
public cinematographic show held in Paris on attempt to bridge the gap between what language is
December 28, 1895, to declare: ‘‘This is life itself’’. A capable of expressing and the reality of the object being
review in La Nature added: ‘‘This is nature caught in the described. The degree to which a semantic, rhetorical, or
act’’. 24 narrative work succeeds in bringing the act of representa-
tion closer to its source, to minimizing the presence ofFilm theorists have long engaged in an attempt to
the intermediary and giving the reader/spectator ananalyze the secret behind creating images so close to the
unmediated view of the object or event being described,original, to the perceived ‘‘real’’, that they prompt such
is corollary to the work’s ability to give concrete form toreactions. The French theorist André Bazin, one of the
represented reality. Of the various media, film possessesfirst to develop the idea of the unique representational
the highest degree of verisimilitude and the most con-quality of the cinematic shot, 25 wrote:
ceptually sympathetic attitude towards attempts to elimi-The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality
nate the gap between representation and reality.of credibility absent from all other picture making. In spite
of any objections our critical spirit may offer, we are forced
Consider the effect of other media. When reading ato accept as real the existence of the object reproduced,
actually re-presented, set before us . . . in time and space. 26 book, a reader is required to imagine for himself or
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herself the reality represented in the text. Moreover, the an active involvement with the events themselves. No
necessity of physically holding the book constantly matter how strongly an audience member experiences
reminds the reader, no matter how much she emotion- the events of a film, the means of representation — the
ally succumbs to the descriptive power of the text, that screen, his or her position in the audience, the projection
her experience of the story is mediated. Paintings are equipment — frustrate engagement and create estrange-
capable of creating a fuller visual image of reality, some- ment. This estranging effect reminds the spectator that
times even demonstrating a degree of photographic he or she cannot overcome the fact that what he or she
realism that ‘‘freezes’’ the scene being captured. Photo- pretends to be ‘‘experiencing’’ is merely a documenta-
graphs narrow the gap even further. But photographs are tion of something that took place at another place and
unable to transmit the sense of dynamic motion or tem- time (i.e., it highlights the fact that the film is an attempt
poral passage possessed by experienced reality. Dance at representation, not a conduit to an alternate reality).
can represent both time and motion, but its conceptual
Like the audience in a movie theatre, the spectatorsapproach is allegorical and not an attempt at copying
at a legal proceeding are powerless to intervene in thereality. Theatre, which is perhaps closest to legal perform-
performance before them. In this sense, legal perform-ance, actually emphasizes its representational qualities
ances have more in common with films than with the-instead of effacing them. Bazin aptly describes this phe-
atre, which might, at first glance, seem a more logicalnomenon in his comparison between the intentional
performative model. The cinematic medium does notartificiality of the theatre and the realistic character of
allow the spectator any meaningful contact with thethe cinematic experience:
characters in the film; he or she is completely estrangedA certain artificiality, an exaggerated transformation of the
from them. In the theatre, on the other hand, the audi-décor, is totally incompatible with that realism which is of
ence’s reaction is an essential part of the theatrical experi-the essence of the cinema. The text of Molière only takes on
meaning in forest of painted canvas and the same is true of ence, and meaning is generated though a process of give
the acting. 29 and take between performers and observers. 31 Law, like
film but unlike theatre, seals off the performance fromWhen we watch a film, on the other hand, we are meant
the audience, thereby estranging viewers from the repre-to feel as if we have been thrust into the reality that the
sentational process.characters in the film are experiencing.
Legal verisimilitude is expressed in the legal system’s Film mandates estrangement through technical
attempts to produce for adjudication a readily recogniz- means, whereas the estrangement of mere spectators to a
able re-enactment of reality. In other words, the legal legal proceeding is normative. In both cases, however, a
system presents itself as having created an unmediated well-defined barrier is maintained between the spectator
view onto the reality of the event being adjudicated, and the events being documented. From a phenomeno-
thereby effacing the gaps in space and time between its logical point of view, the virtual presence of the repre-
occurrence and its re-presentation in the courtroom.30 In sented reality seems to be intense, but the inability to
its strivings for verisimilitude, the law tries to minimize intervene in the narrative reminds the spectator of the
the fact that neither judge nor jury actually has had gap between the representation and the real. A spectator
unmediated experience with the event they are being in the movie theatre or the courtroom cannot leap to the
asked to evaluate. assistance of a character in trouble. Thus, the separation
of the audience from the performance deepens the spec-‘‘Presence’’ is experienced in both the court and the
tators’ sense that they lack control over the events beingcinema on two levels. On one level, a film’s audience and
represented. Instead, such power remains firmly in thea trial’s participants and spectators are conscious of their
hands of whoever controls the means of representation.presence in a particular, defined space, be it movie the-
atre or courtroom. On a second, more important level,
In a court of law, the barrier between spectators andspectators of both films and legal proceedings are asked
participants is reinforced both physically and procedur-to assume or imagine their presence at the events being
ally. Unlike in a Broadway theatre, the public is alloweddepicted (or, perhaps more accurately, to ignore their
only very limited active involvement in the performance,non-presence).
and thus any criticisms that might undermine the legiti-
Yet it is impossible for a spectator to remain com- macy of the legal process are silenced. Booing and clap-
pletely incognizant of his or her absence from the events ping are not tolerated. The reconstruction of reality is
being depicted, despite his or her presence at their depic- conducted exclusively on the witness stand, according to
tion. The tension between these two levels of presence the rules of legal procedure. The judge controls the
— the physical and the virtual — and their idiosyncratic means of representation, and he or she regulates the
relationship is one of the overlapping points between the access of the other participants (the witnesses and attor-
cinematic and legal experiences, between the experience neys) to those means. 32 Even if a spectator with firsthand
of watching a movie and observing a legal proceeding. knowledge of the events being adjudicated wishes to
In neither case is a spectator able to translate his or physically appear in the courtroom and participate in
her sense of ‘‘presence’’ at the events being depicted into their re-creation, he or she will not be allowed to do so
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unless he or she appears as a witness in the manner after an announcement by the bailiff, is somewhat baf-
dictated by the rules of procedure, those same rules that fling, however. What makes these particular accessories
make up the poetics of representing reality within the such effective visual cues of ‘‘justice’’? Why does the
courtroom.33 Any attempt to breach the procedurally wearing of wigs in Britain, or of robes in Europe, so
mandated separation between spectators and partici- vividly represent adjudication and the exposure of truth?
pants will result in physical removal from the courtroom. How is it that these apparently anachronistic visual sym-
bols have managed to survive within the law’s system ofAs a result, in both law and film the audience is
visual representation?present in the location of representation as seers, but is
not itself seen. 34 In spite of the concreteness and vivid- Our thesis is that societal familiarity with these sym-
ness of the event being observed, the audience is never- bols assists in the establishment of a link between
theless absent from it. observable legal proceedings and abstract concepts of
justice and adjudication. Legal proceedings acquireThis experience of simultaneous presence and
authoritative status by, among other things, conformingabsence also characterizes our fraught awareness that
to societal expectations of the way legal proceedings arethere are both onstage and offstage components of the
supposed to appear. Such expectations dwell in our col-representational act. This awareness prevents the suspen-
lective consciousness and largely have been shaped bysion of disbelief from being total in both law and film.
visual images taken from popular culture.Film, like law, tries to reproduce an event that actually
took place in another place and time. The spectator Accordingly, the experience of observing a legal pro-knows, however, that the images in front of him or her ceeding is interpreted by reference to our pre-existingare not merely spontaneously captured representations visual conceptions of what justice and adjudication lookof another reality, but are instead the results of a com- like. One of the main sources of these conceptions is theplex production process aimed at creating precisely the thousands of images that depict ‘‘doing justice’’ in films.performance now being viewed. Consequently, in spite The intriguing conclusion, the implications of which weof the considerable effectiveness of the mimetic illusion, shall discuss in detail in the second half of this article, isthe audience cannot entirely avoid the realization that that legal proceedings strive to resemble cinematic repre-the media’s ability to transmit reality is ever limited by sentations of legal proceedings, in order to therebythe boundaries of the frame. In the case of law, the frame impart the message that they are, in fact, engaged in theis metaphorical and the boundaries are procedural. From legitimate process of doing justice.the moment the complaint or statement of claim is
served, through discovery, the hearing of evidence, and This conclusion is compatible with scholarship that
the final summations by the parties, the event at issue is concentrates on representations of the legal system in
framed, edited and reduced so that it fits within the films, and in fact emerges from many of the studies that
boundaries recognized by the legal system. The narrative have been published on the subject. 36 To a certain
that results, and that forms the basis for whatever norma- extent, it constitutes the raison d’être for engaging in
tive adjudication occurs, is constructed by combining such studies as a form of legal, as opposed to merely
into a linear sequence the reductive descriptions that sociological, scholarship, because interpretations of law
emerge from the colander of legal procedure, which sep- in film are only legally meaningful if they in turn inform
arates legally operative ‘‘facts’’ from the rest of reality. the functioning of the actual legal system. But analysis of
representations of law in film only addresses the manner
in which society perceives and processes images of law. ItThe Performative Character of Legal Proceedings 
leaves the other side of the equation — the ways inThe developing scholarship on law in film can be which the legal system generates meaning through thevery helpful to our project of investigating law as film, manipulation of visual images — unaddressed. It is tobecause films themselves cast an experienced cinemato- address this topic that a study of law as film is pertinent.graphic eye on legal proceedings and thereby highlight
many of their performative aspects. Let us take, for example, a key concept in cinematic
theory, the concept of iconography. 37 In film theory,Whenever one enters a court of law, even if for the
iconography describes the collection of visual imagesvery first time, one finds oneself in an environment that
that have acquired cultural and symbolic values thatis immediately familiar. The importance of visibility to
exceed the bounds of any specific film.38 Iconographythe legal process, and the commonality of the visual
fulfils an important function in the identification andimages that have been adopted to represent adjudication,
definition of genre films. The attractiveness of genrecontribute to the fact that visual representations of con-
films derives to a great extent from their use of familiarcepts such as ‘‘law’’ or ‘‘court’’ are easily identifiable
components that have become trademarks of the genre.across cultural and geographical boundaries. 35
The visual power of the familiar icons of legal pro- Legal proceedings also rely on the iconographic
ceedings, such as the dark robes of the judges, the status of certain elements to provide each legal perform-
podium upon which the judge sits, often under a symbol ance with a general meaning that exceeds the bounds of
of the state, and the ceremonial entrance of the judge the specific event. Décor, costumes, and particular forms
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of character delineation signify that a particular legal Part II: Changes in the Cinematic
proceeding is of the genre ‘‘legal proceedings’’. System of Representation and the
The décor of a law court includes a number of Implications for Legal Procedure 
standard components. An elevated podium usually sits in
ur starting premise has been that society hasthe middle of the scene, with the judge or judges sitting O invested the legal system with the authority to dobehind a desk from which their upper bodies emerge,
justice, and that in order to protect this authority, the lawusually wrapped in robes. This presentation borrows
is required to show that justice is being done. Thisfrom cinematic conventions in order to generate certain
requires legal performances that conform to commonlymeanings and hierarchical relationships. For example,
shared perceptions of justice. Because film held a centralfilming a character from a low angle usually stresses the
place in the construction of these commonly held per-character’s commanding presence. In Westerns, this
ceptions throughout much of the twentieth century, lawangle iconographically signals the great strength of the
tended to choose cinematic devices as the most effectivehero or the enormous wickedness of the villain. Simi-
way of achieving the desired effect. As we move from alarly, the lines of perspective in the courtroom prescribe
filmic culture to a digital one, however, those devices areto a considerable degree the way the scene is received.
beginning to lose their effectiveness. In order to under-The elevated, central positioning of the judge renders
stand developments in contemporary legal practice, then,him or her into an emblem of power, thereby rein-
we must also come to grips with ongoing changes inforcing the legitimacy for his or her decisions. The sym-
contemporary visual culture.metrical lines stretching from the judge to the opposing
parties presents a visual image of the objectivity desired
of the legal system, epitomizing the normative even- The Age of the Moving Image 
handedness expected of the judge.
One of the earliest and most influential analyses of
In most cases, the image of the judge is itself iconic. film’s effect on viewers is found in Walter Benjamin’s
He or she fulfils a function in the concrete legal produc- essay, ‘‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Repro-
tion being observed, but also serves as a recurring symbol duction’’, 40 which describes the dialectical nature of
of justice in legal performances. His or her appearance is visual representation and its function as a parameter for
therefore often as performatively meaningful as his or the evaluation of social reality. Benjamin’s work drew on
her actions. 39 Furthermore, the judge is typically per- the Frankfurt school of thought, which emphasized the
ceived not as an individual with his or her own peculiari- profound social influence of popular art in the formation
ties, personal qualities, and private preferences, but rather of the political consciousness of culture consumers. 41
as the embodiment of the iconic figure of the judge, Indeed, his discussion of the influence of cinematic
exactly as a character in a film can be readily identified expression on social perceptions extends beyond the aes-
as the ‘‘hero’’ or the ‘‘good cop’’ or the ‘‘sheriff’’. Where thetic to the political. Benjamin notes film’s powerful
judges wear gowns, the uniform helps to obscure the ability to represent visual reality as compared with the
contours of the judges’ private personalities and increases artistic mediums that preceded it. But he warns that
their ability to project the desired effects of impartiality these apparently realistic qualities of film threaten to
and abstraction, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the distort our perception of reality, and to lead us to sus-
act of judgment. pend our critical faculties rather than helping us to ana-
lyze the reality that is being reproduced.In the previous subsection, we explored the means
by which the events being adjudicated in a legal pro- Benjamin therefore speaks of the violence of the
ceeding are represented so as to conceal the absence of cinematic medium. This violence is revealed by the
the judge, jury, and spectators from the events them- ambivalence inherent in film. On the one hand, the
selves. In this section, we have taken a step back and precision with which the changing images appear on the
analyzed the devices employed by the legal system to big screen correlates highly with our normal modes of
conform its performances to societal expectations of perception. 42 On the other hand, the object being
what adjudication looks like. In any given legal pro- observed is nothing but the artificial result of complex
ceeding these two types of representation converge into processes of production. The close similarities between
a unity that endeavours to express the message that jus- the way in which cinematic expression and ‘‘everyday
tice is being done, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy and life’’ are perceived make it difficult for the observer of a
authority of the legal system and contributing to social film to grasp and maintain a necessary critical distance.
stability. In other words, when watching a film, it is difficult to
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hold on to our underlying skepticism about the relia- Gombrich, like Benjamin and Kafka, describes the dis-
bility of the intermediating act of representation. The torting effect and illusionary power of visual representa-
apparent similarity of the film-viewing experience to tion. 48 The ever-increasing quantity and quality of
unmediated perception does not force the viewer to give images has acutely disrupted the epistemological value
pause so that he or she can reflect critically on the that we can ascribe to those images as a representation of
images being transmitted. As Benjamin writes: reality. When our perception of the world is shaped so
extensively through the filter of visual culture, such aLet us compare the screen on which a film unfolds with the
complete and sophisticated mechanism of representa-canvas of a painting. The painting invites the spectator to
contemplation; before it the spectator can abandon himself tion is created that our ability to interpret visual images
to his associations. Before the movie frame he cannot do so. is not only undermined (as suggested by Benjamin and
No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already Gombrich), but nullified. With the advent of ever morechanged . . . The spectator’s process of association in view of
technologically sophisticated means for representingthese images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden
‘‘reality’’, the distortion between signifier and signifiedchange. This constitutes the shock effect of the film . . . 43
has reached such enormous proportions that it is impos-According to Benjamin, sequences of moving pic-
sible to differentiate between the two. The dialecticaltures distract the mind and impair one’s ability to
tension foreseen by Benjamin is now being experienceddevelop valid assessments and judgments. Kafka main-
on a massive scale. This condition is expressed by refer-tained a similar position. 44 Both regarded films as a novel
ence to the concept of the simulacra.mechanism for restricting perception and channeling it
in a certain direction, to the exclusion of all others. Both
of them, in fact, stressed film’s tendency to block direct From the Moving Image to the Simulacra 
contact with reality. Time has confirmed Benjamin’s
The term ‘‘simulacrum’’ (Latin for image, shadow,misgivings regarding the use of films by interested par-
or mask) is borrowed from Plato’s metaphor of theties and classes; some would say that he actually underes-
cave. 49 Plato’s cave dwellers see shadows on the walls andtimated the threat.
imagine them to be the only realities. They lack all access
In any event, there is no doubt that the dawning of to the source of the images (which is outside the cave),
the age of cinema fundamentally increased the impor- and therefore perceive these reflections not as mere rep-
tance of visual representation in every sphere of life. The resentations of reality, but as reality itself.
visual image has become a central component in the
Following Plato, our ability to recognize the essen-way in which we process reality. The interdependency
tial nature of justice turns on our ability to scrutinizebetween poll ratings and policy making, or violence and
images of justice, whether created by law or by popularaesthetics, 45 are examples. Nevertheless, it seems that the
culture, and to identify the degree to which they reflectextreme effects that Kafka and Benjamin predicted have
and participate in the abstract concept of justice. Thenot fully come to pass with respect to film itself, even
postmodernist claim is that the current uncontrolledthough the seeds of such effects are inherent within the
abundance of representations has cloaked the epistemo-medium.46 Instead, both authors read like prophets of
logical lighthouse that Plato posited as standing indepen-the simulacra phenomenon that came to be described
dent of these representations, making it impossible todecades afterward in relation to later, follow-on technol-
evaluate their legitimacy and validity.ogies such as television, video, and the Internet.
The concept of the simulacrum was developed byThese technologies enhanced and improved the
several thinkers, including Jameson,50 Baudrillard, 51 andubiquitous systems of visual representation that cinema
Deleuze & Guattari. 52 It describes contemporary culturepreviously had placed at the centre of cultural conscious-
as a continuous flow of images or copies ‘‘whose relationness. Dialectically, these novel technologies simultane-
to the model has become so attenuated that it can noously reduced the value of visual representation as a valid
longer properly be said to be a copy’’. 53 The condition ofepistemological criterion, a process that has come to be
simulacra is complemented by the erosion of verisimili-called the virtualization of reality.
tude.Benjamin identified the seeds of this process in the
This can be clearly recognized in film. The digitalfilmic culture that gave birth to the age of the moving
revolution has made it possible to create imitations ofimage. By 1960, the art critic E.H. Gombrich had already
‘‘reality’’ that were not previously possible. The power ofdescribed the phenomenon in full bloom. Gombrich
cinema to suspend disbelief and produce verisimilitudewrites:
has passed beyond anything that previously was possible.Never before has there been an age like ours when the
Yet the ability to use computer simulation to createvisual image was so cheap in every sense of the word. We
are surrounded and assailed by posters and advertisements, visual effects that until now could only be envisaged by
by comics and magazine illustrations. We see aspects of the imagination — to reproduce ‘‘realities’’ that do not,
reality represented on the television screen and in the and cannot, exist in reality — actually distances us fromcinema, on postage stamps and on food packages . . . I think
verisimilitude. In commenting on this phenomenon,that the victory and vulgarization of representational skills
Baudrillard noted that technological developments increate a problem for both the historian and the critic. 47
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contemporary cinema erase cinematographic illusion reality. At first this process suited the social interests of
almost to the point of disappearance. 54 In an interview law, because it enhanced the legal system’s ability to use
conducted in 1993, he added: ‘‘The more things you add visual, ceremonial, and narrative representations of
to make things real, to achieve absolute realistic verisi- reality in order to assert its own legitimacy. In other
militude, perhaps the further you stray from the secret of words, the emergence of filmic culture originally pro-
cinema’’. 55 moted the project of verisimilitude in law.
The simulacra first appeared as a concept in art Changes in patterns of consumption of moving
criticism, but soon spread to popular culture. The trans- images have led to a diminishment of the verisimilitude
ference of the experience of artistic observation from effect, however. The profusion of images racing across
defined spatial areas (museums, concert halls) to television, video and computer screens has led to
domestic spaces, first identified by Benjamin, lies behind profound changes in the meanings people ascribe to the
the wide social implications of the simulacra condition. representations appearing before their eyes. The
When the primary locus of the moving image was trans- foregrounded artificiality of many of these images, along
ferred from the public cinema hall to the private home with their sheer number, has made the status of a visual
television screen, the simulacra penetrated into the realm representation as a reliable indicator of reality ever more
of private, domestic experience. As a result, the uncon- doubtful. Seeing is no longer believing.
trolled torrent of visual images now spills into every area
The Internet increases the tension between imagesof our lives, influencing our constructions and recon-
and their representative capacity even further. Exposurestructions of nearly every concept. Inevitably, our notions
to the continuous and ever-increasing flow of informa-of justice — and the legal system’s ability to provide it —
tion available on the Internet results in a loss of theare caught up in the flow.
ability to distinguish or define specific sections of signifi-
The time has come to examine how the legal cance, 56 or to endow them with moral and emotional
system, as a major producer of cultural meaning, has meaning. In a culture that is flooded with data that does
absorbed and internalized the simulacra condition. How not coalesce into narratives, that is inundated by an end-
has legal procedure, the poetics of performative adjudica- less stream of images of images, the ability to formulate
tion, grappled with the Sisyphean task of representing normative positions is undermined. 57
justice in an age in which notions of visual representa-
The gradual shift from a culture of verisimilitude totion are undergoing such dramatic changes?
a culture of simulacra threatens the legal system’s ability
to continue using visual images to create legitimacy. Law
The legal implications of cultural is no longer on equal footing with other producers of
developments: How the transition from meaning in the cultural sphere. In the world of simu-
the age of the moving image to the lacra, we are flooded with courtroom dramas, with tele-
culture of simulacra has influenced visual vision channels devoted entirely to ceaseless screenings
representations of adjudication of legal deliberations and simulated legal deliberations,
and to innumerable representations and representationsLaw has always needed to render itself visible, and it
of representations of the law on the Internet. The quaintuses the rules of legal procedure to govern the manner in
legal performances put on in the courtroom by the legalwhich it does so. Legal proceedings purport to re-create
system simply cannot compete. Therefore, our com-in the courtroom an event that occurred at another place
monly shared perceptions of justice and adjudication areand time so that the judge and jury can ‘‘look’’ upon it
constructed with ever increasing predominance fromand evaluate its normative aspects. Those same proceed-
cultural representations of the adjudicative process,ings simultaneously produce images of themselves that
rather than from the visual representations of that pro-comport with societal conceptions of what adjudication
cess performed by the legal system itself. The result is alooks like, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the legal
subversion of verisimilitude.system’s decisions. We have proposed that at a certain
level of abstraction the cinema has similar objectives As a result, the law’s monopoly on authoritative
(with a greater stress on aesthetic production and a wider interpretations of justice is gradually eroding. This trans-
range of subject matter), which it attempts to achieve formation parallels and echoes a century-long cultural
through recourse to particular technical and poetic shift that accelerated at the end of the twentieth century,
means. wherein the loci of production of meanings shifted from
The legal system was developing methods for defined, bordered spaces such as courtrooms, cinemas, or
effacing the gap between representation and reality hun- museums, to decentralized spaces largely devoid of fixed
dreds of years before film was invented, but the techno- interpretive hierarchies. The first kind of cultural produc-
logical capabilities of film allow it to achieve a level of tion is characterized by the autonomy and authority
verisimilitude far beyond the capacity of law. Moreover, retained by specialized producers of meaning within
the popularity of cinema and its profound social influ- their defined fields. Contemporary, decentralized pro-
ence have made systems of visual representation into an duction, on the other hand, yields a wealth of representa-
increasingly dominant component in our structuring of tions that appear everywhere and at all times, but
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without any structural hierarchies to aid in the process of courtroom, 62 but such a legal system will also be
decipherment. This sumptuousness subverts the barrier sheathed in an aura of verisimilitude attributable to the
between reality and image, undermines the inter-institu- presumed trustworthiness of the narratives that it creates
tional balance of power, and subverts the exclusivity of for purposes of adjudication. By ensuring that only those
‘‘legal’’ justice. It is no wonder then that even legal narratives that strictly follow the rules of legal poetics (i.e.,
scholars have come to realize the necessity of using cine- those that are produced according to the rules of legal
matic themes to develop new moral sensitivities and procedure) are performed before it, the legal system can
guidelines appropriate to this new environment. 58 portray itself as only dealing with ‘‘facts’’ (or, to put it
more obliquely, with unmediated transmissions ofThe following section will examine some practical
reality).implications of the conditions we have been describing.
We maintain that a realization of the resonance between When a movie director tries to create an effect of
legal and cinematic expression can be used to develop verisimilitude (i.e., when he or she tries to narrow the
innovative critical thinking about the intersection audience’s awareness of the gaps between reality and its
between visual representations of adjudication and the cinematic representation), he or she uses visual devices
actual process of doing justice. In this light we will and cues (such as camera movements and editing
explore the parallel erosion of verisimilitude and the sequences) appropriate to cinematic poetics. The legal
normative status of procedural rules in the courtroom. system uses procedural rules to the same effect. The
American legal system takes great pains to ensure thatWe will then discuss two well-known representa-
evidence that is obtained in a way that might arousetions of procedural justice in criminal law, the Miranda
suspicions as to the accuracy of the re-creation beingwarning and the warrant requirement, both of which,
performed in the courtroom is not offered. Just as unex-we believe, developed out of a belief that visual represen-
pected editing or the inclusion of the film crew in thetation serves as an effective epistemological criterion — a
background of a scene would ruin the effect of verisimili-belief derived, in large part, from the cinematic enter-
tude in a movie by calling attention to the gaps betweenprise. The recent erosion in the normative standing of
reality and representation, a failure to follow the rules ofthe Miranda warning and the warrant requirement, we
legal poetics would subvert the notion that what is beingbelieve, has similarly been influenced by the erosion of
watched and analyzed in the courtroom is ‘‘reality.’’verisimilitude in visual culture more generally.
At a certain point, however, this obsession with
The Miranda Warning and the Warrant formal proceduralism came to be seen as excessive (in
Requirement — The Blurring of both law and film). The preference for procedural justice
Procedural Representations and realism over ‘‘essential’’ justice and truth began to
seem empty, an undeserved favouring of form over con-The Miranda warning59 and the warrant require-
tent. Strict adherence to procedure, originally adopted asment60 are exclusionary rules that prevent evidence that
a way of ensuring the system’s legitimacy, became,is unconstitutionally obtained from being offered into
instead, a threat to it.evidence. Evidence so obtained, or evidence discovered
based on information so obtained, is described as the We earlier noted that film’s ever-increasing techno-
‘‘fruit of the poisonous tree’’. 61 logical ability to produce apparently realistic images,
Exclusionary rules elevate, in certain circumstances, which was once its source of epistemological validity,
procedural fairness over results-oriented justice. This eventually led to widespread suspicion of the credibility
favouring of procedural fairness can be described in of filmic depictions. A similar dialectic can be observed
terms of the legal system’s need to convince society that with respect to the law. The tendency to sacrifice results-
the means it uses to achieve justice are legitimate. In oriented justice on the altar of procedural purity — a
order to do that, law has to convince us that the re- phenomenon we have described in terms of the neces-
creation of the events to be adjudicated that occurs in sity of adhering strictly to the rules of legal poetics in
the courtroom provides the judge and jury with an order to maintain the illusion of verisimilitude — began
unmediated glimpse into the reality of those events, to arouse wide spread criticism.63 These critics argued
rather than merely presenting a speculative representa- that the American legal system had stretched the maxim
tion of past events to which neither the judge nor the that ‘‘justice must be seen to be done’’ too far, to the
jury has any direct access. When the legal system priori- extent, in fact, that the representation of justice had
tizes procedure over what would appear to be the merits, become more important than the actual doing of justice.
it is motivated by the concern that has been the subject Such criticism damaged the very legitimacy that the legal
of this article: The need to create convincing visual repre- system had tried to obtain through its emphasis on clear
sentations of adjudication in order to legitimize the representations of societal expectations of just adjudica-
system as a whole. A legal system that strictly upholds tion in the first place. This damage resulted from the
exclusionary rules may occasionally sacrifice the accuracy inevitable eruption of the tension between representa-
of some of its results by choosing, as a matter of policy, to tion and reality that occurs when dedication to the
block certain reconstructions of reality from entering the means of production goes unchecked, leading to an over-
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emphasis on procedure, or technology, for their own jury was at the scene. Instead, what is presented to judge
sakes, rather than for the sake of the production of a and jury is a simple visual image: The playing out of the
convincing portrait of reality. 64 ‘‘warning-giving’’ scene scripted by Justice Warren. Legal
scholars have long debated this preference for a brightChronologically, the ‘‘age of verisimilitude’’ in the
line rule over more subtle tests for evaluating the trust-cinema, which began in the second quarter of the past
worthiness of information provided by suspects undercentury and reached its height in the third quarter, over-
interrogation. 72 To comment intelligently on the matter,laps almost exactly with the golden age of procedural
one has to take into account not just the suspect’s rightsjustice established by the Warren Court. 65 These years
but the legal system’s interest in the performative naturewitnessed both strict enforcement of the warrant
of legal proceedings.requirement and the formulation and rigorous applica-
tion of the Miranda warning. There is also a remarkable A familiar poetic device in cinematic language is the
affinity between the subsequent erosion of faith in cine- ordering of scenes so as to indicate that a character
matic verisimilitude, and the decline and fall of legal obtained information in one scene that is relevant in a
proceduralism. later scene. A mere alternation of camera shots, with no
inherent meaning, builds, pursuant to cinematic poetics,
into a comprehensible narrative. The Miranda warningThe Miranda Warning 
dictates a narrative in a similar fashion.
The Supreme Court’s 1966 ruling in Miranda v.
Arizona, 66 which established the famous ‘‘Miranda Critics of Miranda have argued that rather than pro-
warning’’, was the centerpiece of a line of decisions that tecting the rights of the interrogated, the warning actu-
dealt with the admissibility of statements by suspects ally threatens them, because even suspects who have no
under interrogation. 67 Justice Warren’s majority opinion understanding of those rights are deemed to have com-
provided a specific formulation of the warning that prehended them if they received the warning. But from a
henceforth had to be recited to suspects before they performative perspective, Miranda fills an important
could be questioned. Because it is quoted so frequently function: The clear visual spectacle it proscribes, in
in films and on television, the holding is well known which the suspect takes place in a scene in which he or
even among laymen: she receives certain information, arouses narrative expec-
tations among its audience (the judge, the jury, or the[T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as spectators in the courtroom) that are not easily dispelled.
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence There is thus a tension inherent in Miranda. The visually
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 68 evocative scene dictated by the Warren Court enhances
If we try to ignore our kitsch-like familiarity with the legitimacy of the legal system on one level, because
Miranda from popular culture, we can probe these the system appears to be complying with narratives of
words for the motivation that lay behind the ruling. fairness and justice, but in the process, the actual doing
Warren’s opinion, it seems to us, reflects a belief in the of justice is rendered more difficult, because the narrative
power of clear verbal and visual messages to authenticate pull of conventions like the giving of the Miranda
any resulting narratives (here, the information provided warning is so strong that it threatens to obscure, rather
by the suspect after he or she has received the Miranda than elucidate, what actually happened.
warning). Warren uses rhetoric that emphasizes the visi-
In the age of the simulacra, the representative powerbility of legal and procedural safeguards: He demands
and visual spectacle of the Miranda warning has led to itsthe performance of a visual warning along the lines of
endless reproduction in cinematic and televised depic-what he has written — almost a line reading. 69 And he
tions of arrest. When we see someone being read his ordemands such a warning because it shows the legal
her rights, we immediately draw the conclusion ‘‘thatsystem acting fairly, thereby reinforcing the idea that it is
person has been arrested’’. Through sheer repetition, thecapable of doing justice. 70 For Warren, this visibility was
Miranda warning has gone from being a legal perform-more important than the superior information that
ance that enhances legal legitimacy through the creationmight be extracted from the suspect using other, more
of an image that complies with societal expectations ofcovert, means.
justice, to a progenitor of simulacra. There are now so[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether
many images of Miranda floating around that as a signi-the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning
being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant fier, it no longer points to a particular, intended signified
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, (in this case, that the suspect understands his or her
intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be rights and can reliably provide information under inter-more than speculation; a warning is a clear-cut fact. 71
rogation).
Mandatory issuance by the police of Miranda warnings
creates a situation in which judges and juries do not have While the devaluation of the epistemic reliability of
to speculate on the voluntary nature of statements made the Miranda  warning is but one manifestation of a more
by suspects under interrogation: A fact-specific inquiry general undercutting of visual representations’ status as
that inevitably highlights the fact that neither judge nor authoritative indicators of the truth, from a dialectical
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perspective this is not the only result of the cultural prerequisite if the fruits of a police search are to be
overflow of Miranda images. Images of Miranda are often offered into evidence, ‘‘to a procedural requirement
used in films to deconstruct and expose the gap between sometimes acknowledged and rarely enforced. Current
representation and reality that the legal system originally fourth amendment doctrine is so muddy, and the
used Miranda to conceal. Miranda was originally Court’s message is so deprecatory of fourth amendment
imposed as a way of indicating that the legal system acts rights’’. 85
justly. In films, however, we often see a character who we The status of the warrant requirement (like the
know to be innocent being read his or her rights as a status of the Fourth Amendment as a whole) has been
way of indicating that he or she is being arrested. In further weakened in the aftermath of the events of Sep-
these instances, the familiar visual image of the Miranda tember 11, 2001. 86
warning sends the image not that the legal system is
The warrant requirement, like the Mirandalegitimate and applies normative evaluations only to
warning, dictates that a certain scene be played out forreality, but instead that it is fallible and undeserving of its
purposes of narrative continuity and verisimilitude. Justmonopoly over interpretations and pronouncements of
as a film director uses particular camera shots and cine-justice. Cinematic depictions of Miranda are thus used to
matic devices to establish the trustworthiness of a givenset forth alternative interpretive hierarchies, in which
character, the law mandates that performers act out cer-other conceptions of justice compete for authority with
tain scenes in order to create an effect of verisimilitude.the official ones produced by the legal system.
According to legal poetics (i.e., the rules of legal proce-Along with decreased confidence in the representa- dure), information obtained during a search must betional capacity of the Miranda warning has come a series preceded by the obtaining of a warrant in order to beof efforts to chip away at Miranda itself. This began with authentic. Thus, the audience in a courtroom has aCongress’s passage of a law that sought to circumvent the means for evaluating whether the events being re-createddecision. According to the law, the admissibility of state- in a legal proceeding are a glimpse onto a past ‘‘reality’’ments made by suspects would depend entirely upon a or a mere fabrication. Pursuant to the rules of legalholistic determination of whether such statements were poetics, the evaluation turns on the existence of a pre-made voluntarily. 73 This legislative attempt has been fol- ceding scene in which the authorities obtained a war-lowed by a series of judicial decisions, creating a string of rant. 87exceptions and limitations to the Warren Court’s orig-
Procedural rules’ ability to shape the ways in whichinal ruling. 74
expression is produced in the courtroom creates ambiva-
lences, however. Systems of poetics, like other systems ofThe Warrant Requirement 
rules, not only proscribe ways of producing meaning, but
The warrant requirement arises from the Fourth also block other ways of doing so. Thus, steps that serve
Amendment to the American Constitution. 75 Although the purposes of producing procedural justice and
the Fourth Amendment makes no mention of the inad- performative legitimacy likely obstruct the production of
missibility of evidence obtained by illegal means, the other kinds of meaning, such as results-based justice. In
Supreme Court held as early as 1914 that the amend- order to obscure the costs of such choices, the legal
ment compelled exclusion of evidence procured uncon- system employs noble-sounding maxims, such as ‘‘justice
stitutionally. 76 Seven years later, in Gouled v. United must be seen to be done.’’ But in today’s nonhierarchical,States, the Court made a comprehensive ruling that evi- virulently multi-polar visual culture, it is impossible for
dence obtained through illegal searches or seizures con- the legal system to control the images of itself that it
ducted by federal authorities was inadmissible in federal transmits to the public, including the visual representa-
court. 77 In 1961 the ruling was extended to the states. 78 tions of adjudication that it formerly used to establish its
During the 1960s the warrant-based exclusionary rule own legitimacy. The proliferation of representations of
attained its broadest sweep. 79 For example, in Katz v. the warrant requirement in popular culture, where theyUnited States, the Court announced that: cannot be controlled by the legal system, threatens to
. . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without expose the gaps between reality and representation that
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreason- the legal system itself struggled to conceal, as well as theable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few
associated costs.specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 80
Beginning in the 1970s, and with increasing rapidity From the 1960s onward, audiences have been fre-
during the 1980s and 1990s, a gradual erosion began to quently confronted with depictions of the warrant
take place in the rule established by Weeks, Gouled, requirement in Hollywood films, including many scenes
Mapp and Katz . 81 Matters soon reached the point where that cast doubt on the reliability of evidence procured
critics claimed the warrant requirement ‘‘is theory, not during a search undertaken ‘‘according to law’’. There
fact’’, 82 that ‘‘[t]he per se rule fails to reflect judicial prac- are also innumerable scenes in which criminals block
tice’’, 83 and that ‘‘in practice warrants are the exception the authorities by demanding a warrant; determined
rather than the rule’’. 84 Over the course of the last 30 policemen take the law into their own hands and ignore
years, then, a warrant has gone from being an absolute the warrant requirement in order to serve a higher good;
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smooth-talking attorneys save dangerous criminals from flexible enough to favour the creation of visual represen-
being convicted by arguing that a warrant was lacking; tations when society demanded them as a guarantor of
judges hurriedly sign unjustified orders and allow for the accurate depictions of reality. The slow but inexorable
invasion of innocent people’s privacy (while other judges proliferation of Miranda and warrant-requirement
obstruct hard-working cops by making them fill out red images has changed them, however, from mimetic
tape). Legal proceedings never play out the consequences devices to pastiche, 89 from rules that promote visibility to
of the warrant requirement, which take place outside the those that function as simulacra. As a result, the law has
bounds of a legal performance, but films do so with had to adjust in turn, both in its doctrinal treatment of
startling frequency. And those consequences can be sub- the exclusionary rule and in the methods it uses to per-
versive. form convincing depictions of adjudication and justice.
Cinematic representations of the warrant require- We take no normative position as to the develop-
ment track the legal evolution of the warrant require- ments we have been describing. Our point throughout
ment. The warrant requirement is gradually being down- has been that there is an interplay between filmic culture
graded and eroded by the courts88 as part and parcel of and legal procedure that long has been overlooked, and
the general erosion of procedural and evidentiary protec- that can help us inquire into and explain developments
tions originally enacted to promote legal visibility. Simul- that otherwise might appear puzzling or random. Fur-
taneously, depictions of the warrant requirement in ther inquiry along these lines can strengthen our under-
films, on television, and on the Internet increasingly standing of the goals of law and the methods available
question its efficacy and reveal its costs, disputing, in the for achieving them, as well as deepening our knowledge
process, the interpretive authority of the legal system of the way law is practised on an everyday basis.
(which is tied up with the legitimacy it gains through the
persuasive power of legal performances governed by
rules like the warrant requirement). Thus, the legal
system’s authoritative status as the primary producer of Conclusion: From Motion Pictures
‘‘justice’’ in society begins to be called into question. to Moving Images 
n the preface to Simulacra and Simulation, Baudril-
Summary I lard describes the concept of simulacra by analogy to
a psychosomatic patient. For purely psychological rea-The shifting status of the Miranda warning and the
sons, psychosomatics develops real symptoms of illnesses.warrant requirement demonstrate how changes in visual
Thus, when a given psychosomatic appears to fall ill,cultural generally are reintegrated into the legal system,
there is no way for an external viewer to determinedisrupting the system’s ability to control the production
whether the illness is a real one or a psychosomatic one.of meanings in legal proceedings, a theatre of perform-
Such a patient blurs the distinctions between true andance in which it had long perceived of itself as acting
false, between the real and the imagined:autonomously. The inquiry we have conducted into the
interdependent dialectics of visual representation in film Is the simulator sick or not, given that he produces true
and legal procedure has enabled us to identify some of symptoms? Objectively one cannot treat him as being either
ill or not ill. Psychology and medicine stop at this point,the pressing challenges facing the legal system as it
forestalled by the illness’s henceforth undiscoverable truth.attempts to preserve its authority and legitimacy in a
For if any symptom can be produced, and can no longer beradically changing world. The disintegration of the taken as a fact of nature, then every illness can be considered
Miranda  warning and the warrant requirement as epis- as simulatable and simulated, and medicine loses its
meaning since it only knows how to treat illnessestemologically reliable devices supports our thesis that
according to their objective causes. 90traditional legal poetics — expressed through the rules of
legal procedure — lack the ability to continue to func- Baudrillard’s observations about medicine are
tion as an effective system of visual representation. equally applicable to law in today’s environment. Repre-
Where a visual representation once implied verisimili- sentations of justice have become so predominant in
tude (i.e., reliable information regarding the reality popular culture, and the influence of those representa-
depicted by the representation), visual representations tions on societal constructions of justice runs so deep,
have now come to be seen as mere images or simulacra, that it is longer possible to distinguish between ‘‘real’’
signifiers that only point to other signifiers and bear no justice (symptoms of real, physical illnesses) and exter-
connection to any reality or source. As a result of these nally produced images of it (psychosomatic symptoms).
changes, legal poetics — like cinematic poetics — have And just as the study of reality can no longer be sepa-
difficulty in producing representations that are consid- rated from the study of images of reality, so the study of
ered legitimate or authoritative by contemporary audi- adjudication — the doing of justice — can no longer be
ences. People no longer buy into the maxim that seeing separated from the representation of justice. But unlike
is believing. those post-modernists (and their traditionalist critics)
who insist that such premises inevitably lead to theIn shaping the Miranda warning and the warrant
‘‘death of justice’’, we, instead, would like to propose thatrequirement, the rules of legal poetics proved themselves
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our current position gives us a uniquely interesting crit- manner titillates the imagination of legislators and aca-
ical perspective. demics. Some zealously call for the mass adoption of
these technologies as evidentiary tools that can greatlyIn this article, we have argued that there is a symbi-
improve the quality of judges’ and juries’ decision-otic link between cinema and the law, and that this link
making. 91 Those who question the incursion of suchcan be used to deepen our understanding of the ways in
technologies into the courtroom are accused of beingwhich the legal system functions. Film theorists would
reactionary, anachronistic, and technophobic. A higherbenefit from pursuing this resonance as well. For
awareness of the epistemological processes involvedexample, the complex interconnections between the
might shift the focus of the debate. In this connection, apoetics of legal proceedings and cinematographic poetics
historical understanding of the semantic changes thatmay help to explain the abiding popularity of legal pro-
film has undergone over the past century could proveceedings as a theme and plot device in films. If the law is
vital.really, as Todorov claims, the natural arena for performa-
tive attempts at verisimilitude, then it is no wonder that The development of the basic theoretical tools wethe medium whose main objective is the creation of have suggested will make it possible to reexamineverisimilitude revisits the law again and again. polemical debates, including those surrounding the evi-
We have tried to map out some of the ways in dentiary status of reenactments, the televised broadcast
which the poetics of law replicate, or resonate with, the of trials, and other areas in which the performative
poetics of film. We hope that the initial lines of delinea- aspects of the law are foregrounded, in a new light. 92
tion presented here will encourage others to continue They will also help us weigh the desirability of any
this process, thereby further shedding light on the legal restrictions the legal system might place upon the intro-
system’s attempts to render justice and adjudication vis- duction of new technologies in order to limit the total
ible. Such attempts will surely run parallel with con- imposition of the simulacra effect in the courtroom.
tinued efforts to trace the relationship between law and Without such regulations, courtrooms may soon find
other semantic fields, such as literature and theatre, not themselves flooded with an uncontrolled, and uncon-
to mention film’s potent, much unexamined offspring, trollable, stream of moving images that threaten to
television and the Internet. undermine the epistemological and societal status of the
The technological capabilities available today for re- law as the entity that defines both how justice must be
presenting factual events in a virtual, apparently fail-safe seen, and how it must be done.
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